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Releasing Jobs for the Young?
Early Retirement and 
Youth Unemployment 
in the United Kingdom
James Banks, Richard Blundell, Antoine Bozio, 
and Carl Emmerson
11.1    Introduction
Previous volumes of the International Social Security project at the NBER 
have shown convincingly that the incentives provided by pension schemes 
provisions have had a strong negative impact on labor force participation 
at older ages (Gruber and Wise 1999, 2004). Many countries increased the 
generosity of their state pension provision in the 1970s, despite the fact 
that demographic changes (both diﬀerences in cohort sizes and higher 
life expectancy) would subsequently pose serious threats to the ﬁ  nancial 
viability of those pension schemes. In many instances, it was stressed that 
changes to pension provisions have somehow been made with the idea to 
“release jobs” for the young. Indeed, with unemployment increasing after 
the 1970’s oil shocks, it is perhaps unsurprising that European governments 
were implementing various reforms aimed at reducing unemployment, and 
youth unemployment in particular. In other words, increased incentives to 
retire early may have been motivated by this expected impact of early retire-
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ment: less unemployment among the young only at the expense (and beneﬁ  t) 
of more leisure time among the old.1
This chapter tries to take this claim seriously and assess whether we have 
any empirical evidence of links between early retirement and youth unem-
ployment. Most economists would today dismiss the idea immediately as 
another version of the naive “lump- of- labor fallacy.”2 In its most basic form, 
this proposition holds that there is a ﬁ  xed supply of jobs and that any reduc-
tion in labor supply will reduce unemployment by oﬀering jobs to those who 
are looking for one. Taken to the extreme, this view would support that the 
idea that a high level of employment of one group of individuals can only 
be at the expense of another group: if, for instance, were the population of 
a country to increase, younger individuals would be unemployed as older 
individuals would not “release” enough jobs for the new entrants. The absur-
dity of this view in the long term is simply seen by considering the fact that 
the size of a country does not bear any relation to the share of population 
unemployed.
There might be, however, a subtler claim, that is, that controlling for popu-
lation size (and overall demand), the employment rate of younger work-
ers might be aﬀected by the share of older workers employed. Older and 
younger workers might have diﬀerent characteristics in terms of qualiﬁ  ca-
tions, skills, and productivity and, therefore, be more or less substitutable 
depending on the degree of ﬂ  exibility of labor markets. Some economists 
have suggested that speciﬁ  c policies to encourage employment of the old 
might end up being counterproductive if, for instance, productivity declines 
markedly with age and if the wages of older workers end up above their 
productivity. Mulligan and Sala-  i-  Martin (1999) suggest provocatively that 
negative externalities of older workers might lead to the incentives for early 
exit from the labor force.
Given that changes in pension systems should be, and usually are, for the 
very long term, our interest is to look for a long-  term relationship between 
labor force participation rates of the old and employment rates of the young: 
it is very likely that labor markets take time to adjust to changes in age or 
sex composition and that substitution eﬀects could be seen in the very short 
term. Hence, we will cover labor markets and policies in the United King-
dom over more than forty years and provide empirical evidence on programs 
abandoned a long time ago. This historical background will prove essential 
to provide empirical evidence for a relationship (or absence of relationship) 
intrinsically diﬃcult to uncover.
The challenges when estimating a causal relationship between the employ-
ment rates of diﬀerent age groups rest on a combination of endogeneity and 
general equilibrium eﬀects. At the micro level, controlling for enough fac-
1. Evidence on the impact of pension arrangements on the public ﬁ  nances and on the welfare 
of older individuals can be found in Gruber and Wise (2007 and forthcoming, respectively).
2. Other versions include capping weekly hours of paid work, limits to immigration, or 
increased incentives for mothers to stay at home, all as means to reduce unemployment.Early Retirement and Youth Unemployment in the United Kingdom    3 2 1
tors, a degree of substitution must indeed be apparent. Workers of similar 
qualiﬁ  cation, skill, ability, experience, and other characteristics should be 
at least partly substitutable if one controls for total output. This micro-
  substitution is of particular interest for labor economists but does not lead 
to speciﬁ  c conclusions on the overall employment relationship between older 
workers and younger ones. The question we would like to answer is uncon-
ditional, that is, does a higher (lower) rate of labor force participation of 
older worker increase (decrease) unemployment of the younger ones, not 
controlling for the fact that output might be higher (lower)?
At the macro level, where the macro-  substitution is to be found, one is 
faced with the problem of endogeneity. Changes in the employment of the 
old are not exogenous and react, with youth unemployment, to general 
changes in labor demand, following, for example, the ups and downs of 
business cycles. These shifts in labor demand may be hard to control for. 
Moreover, they are usually measured by changes in gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP), that is, by changes in measured output. Interpretations of an 
absence of substitution at the macro level will, therefore, be hard to distin-
guish from simultaneity issues.
The ﬁ  rst step in our analysis is to examine the importance of incentives 
to retire on older labor force supply in the United Kingdom over the last 
forty years. We describe the reforms to pension system and early retirement 
schemes to assess in what respect are the changes in ﬁ  nancial incentives exog-
enous from the labor market situation. The UK case is very interesting in 
that respect, as most of the pension reforms—and, arguably, all of the major 
reforms in the 1980s and 1990s—were motivated more by public ﬁ  nance 
considerations (both short and long run) than by unemployment. Section 
11.2 describes the debates concerning the relationship between the number 
of older and younger workers in the United Kingdom and discusses in what 
respect they led to changes in policies to foster early exit of older workers. 
Section 11.3 contains descriptive ﬁ  gures comparing the labor force partici-
pation of older individuals in the United Kingdom with the evolution of 
employment for younger individuals as well as a cross-  country comparison 
of the French and the UK experience. Section 11.4 describes in detail the 
Job Release Scheme (JRS), the major UK early retirement scheme of the late 
1970s and early 1980s, and presents estimations of what could be considered 
to be a “natural experiment” of speciﬁ  c incentives to encourage early retire-
ment. Section 11.5 describes the methodology of comparable regressions 
both at the micro level and in times series of the relationship between young 
and old labor force participation. Section 11.6 concludes.
11.2      Debates and Policies in the United Kingdom
Compared to many continental European countries, the United Kingdom 
has not developed extensive policies to encourage older workers to leave jobs 
for the young. This does not mean that debates and policies about the “lump 322        James Banks, Richard Blundell, Antoine Bozio, and Carl Emmerson
of labor” have been absent from the United Kingdom, quite the contrary. 
The debate about work sharing started in nineteenth century United King-
dom about working-  time regulations. Walker (2007) traces back the ﬁ  rst 
appearance of the expression “lump- of- labour fallacy” to an article from the 
UK economist David F. Schloss (1891) and suggests that it is the London-
 based  magazine  The Economist that has lately popularized the phrase by 
repeatedly denouncing the “fallacy.”3 If the debate about work sharing was 
mostly conﬁ  ned to hours of work, the idea that reducing the labor supply 
of older workers could help mitigate the rise in unemployment was most 
keenly put forward in the aftermath of the late 1970s oil shock (Laczko and 
Phillipson 1991).
The ﬁ  rst policy that led to the growth of early exit from the labor force 
was the Redundancy Payments Act of 1965, which required employers to 
make lump-  sum payments to workers who lost their jobs. The idea was not 
to ﬁ  ght unemployment but to help reduce overstaﬃng in UK industries by 
securing greater acceptance of these restructuring and facilitating workers’ 
mobility to new jobs. In practice, however, the Act was used by companies to 
get rid of older workers and, thus, to encourage early exit. Early retirement 
packages by private companies have been used extensively in the late 1970s, 
but comprehensive information is very scarce about these private schemes.
Pension reforms in the United Kingdom have not been inﬂ  uenced heavily 
by concerns about unemployment of the young (see box 11.1 for a chronol-
ogy of UK pension reforms from 1975 to the present).4 The UK pension 
debate has largely been focused on the trade-  oﬀ between social assistance, 
that is, providing a minimum income to the elderly, and social insurance, 
that is, increasing the contributory principle of pension provision. Con-
cerns about the cost to the public ﬁ  nances have tended to reduce this latter 
objective to a minimum. The 1975 Social Security Act (applied from April 
1978) increased the generosity of the Basic State Pension (BSP) scheme and 
introduced the State Earnings-  Related Pension Scheme (SERPS), to pro-
vide higher beneﬁ  ts, related to earnings, for those employees who were not 
a member of an employer’s deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t pension arrangement. Two years 
later, in 1980, the generosity of state pensions was reduced with an index-
ation in line with the growth in prices instead of the greater of the growth in 
prices or earnings. This reduced generosity took place while unemployment 
was increasing and concerns for the labor market implications were clearly 
not motivating these reforms. Since then, overall state spending on pensions 
remained at a roughly constant share of UK GDP, as ﬁ  gure 11.1 provides 
clear evidence.
The main policy that explicitly had the goal to reduce elderly employment 
3. Walker (2007) expresses a sceptical view of the idea that economists have been able to prove 
the “lump-  of-  labor” to be a fallacy indeed.
4. For an overview of the pension system in the United Kingdom, see Blundell and John-
son (1998), Dilnot et al. (1994), Dilnot, Kay, and Morris (1984), and Disney and Emmerson 
(2005).Box 11.1  Reforms to the U.K. State Pension System, 1975 to present day
Social Security 
Act 1975
Basic State Pension (BSP) made more generous for those with certain 
formal caring responsibilities from April 1978. Married women no 
longer given the choice of opting out of the BSP from April 1977.
State Earnings- Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) introduced for all 
employees not in a deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t employer arrangement from 
April 1978. Entitlement based on the best twenty years of earnings 
(between a lower and an upper earnings limit set) uprated to retire-
ment by growth in average earnings. Accrual rate set at 25 percent.
Social Security 
Act 1980
State pension payments to be increased by growth in prices instead 
of the greater of growth in prices or earnings from November 1980.
Social Security 
Act 1986
Entitlement to SERPS to be calculated on the basis of earnings over 
entire working life (sixteen to state pension age) rather than across 
the best twenty years phased in for those reaching the state pension 
age from April 2000 onward.
The accrual factor on SERPS to be reduced from 25 percent to 20 
percent of earnings between the lower and upper earnings limits. 
This is being phased in for those reaching the state pension age 
between April 2000 and March 2008, although accrued entitlement 
from before April 1988 is protected.
Surviving partners of those dying after April 2000 to inherit 50 per-
cent of their spouse’s state pension instead of 100 percent. (This 
change was later put back to October 2002 after the Department for 
Social Security failed to correctly inform some individuals of this 




State pension age for women to be increased from sixty to sixty- 
ﬁ  ve gradually between 2010 and 2020 (by one month every two 
months).
Technical change made to the formula used to calculate SERPS en-
titlement. This reduced the generosity of SERPS to those reaching 
the state pension age after April 1999, with both retrospective and 
prospective SERPS rights reduced.
Child Support, 
Pensions and 
 Social  Security 
Act 2000
The State Second Pension (S2P) to replace SERPS from April 2002 
onward. This is more generous to lower earners and to some indi-
viduals with caring responsibilities.
Pension Act 
2007
Both the level and the coverage of the BSP to be increased. The level 
is to be earnings (rather than price) indexed from some point between 
2012 and 2015. For those reaching the state pension age from April 
2010 onward, the number of qualifying years needed to receive a full 
BSP reduced from thirty-  nine for women and forty-  four for men to 
thirty years for both. Accrual of S2P to be reduced for higher earn-
ers to claw back some of the increase in BSP.
State pension age to be increased from sixty- ﬁ  ve to sixty- eight grad-
ually between 2024 and 2046.324        James Banks, Richard Blundell, Antoine Bozio, and Carl Emmerson
in order to reduce youth unemployment was the JRS. It was introduced in 
1977 and was described as “a measure which allows older workers to retire 
early in order to release jobs for the registered unemployed” (Department 
of Employment 1978). The debates in Parliament about the scheme were 
not so much about its eﬀectiveness (substitution between older workers and 
younger ones was assumed to be very high) but about the gross cost of such 
a scheme. The following exchange in the House of Commons in 1979 is very 
revealing of the debate in the United Kingdom in the late 1970s:5
Mr. Atkins, MP: “In view of the large numbers of people involved, would 
not even a phased reduction of the age to sixty provide many thousands of 
jobs for younger people? Is it not a fact that there is an even more urgent 
need because of the rapid development of microcomputer technology?”
Mr. Grant, The Undersecretary of State for Employment: “This is a cost-
 e ﬀective way of dealing with the problem. Nevertheless, it entails addi-
tional resources and, therefore, must be looked at in the light of overall 
priorities. However, it is being considered further.
The scheme appeared at the time to be limited in its achievement due to the 
fact that the take-  up rate remained low (Makeham and Morgan 1980). The 
allowance being unrelated to earnings, the incentives for an early exit was 
conﬁ  ned to low-  wage earners and those who could draw an occupational 
Fig. 11.1    State spending on ﬁ  nancial transfers to pensioners in Great Britain, 
1948–1949 to 2007–2008
Source: Emmerson, Tetlow, and Wakeﬁ  eld (2005).
5. House of Commons, 20th February 1979, Hansard, vol. 963 cc228-  9.Early Retirement and Youth Unemployment in the United Kingdom    3 2 5
pension alongside the JRS allowance. In 1984, suggestions by some MPs to 
make the scheme earnings- related were rejected on the ground of cost.6 Until 
the end of the scheme in 1988, there were repeated claims from some MPs to 
increase the scope of the scheme by reducing the age at which an individual 
could take opportunity of it (we will see in the next section that the scope 
was indeed changed many times). Calls for expansion of the scheme can be 
seen as late as the 1987 Labour Party general election manifesto.7
We will extend the voluntary Job Release Scheme to men over 60 so that 
those who want to retire early vacate jobs for those who are currently 
unemployed. This could take as many as 160,000 people out of unemploy-
ment and into work.
Similar claims—albeit on a smaller scale—can be found in the 1987 Lib-
eral/Social Democratic Party (SDP) manifesto: “For the long-  term unem-
ployed we will provide a guarantee of a job through (. . .) an expanded job 
release scheme, opening up 30,000 jobs by allowing men to beneﬁ  t from the 
scheme at 62 years of age.”
In the early 1980s, the government’s main policy toward the elderly was to 
reduce their labor supply in order to reduce the numbers on the unemploy-
ment register (Brown 1990). In 1981, men aged sixty and over who had been 
unemployed for one year could claim the long-  term supplementary beneﬁ  t 
rate provided they ceased to register for unemployment. In 1983, this possi-
bility was extended to all men aged sixty and over. These measures were 
not expected to release jobs for the young but simply to reduce the formal 
unemployment count.
In the same period, it was debated whether to reduce state pension age for 
men from sixty- ﬁ  ve to sixty in order to make it the same for men and women. 
Interestingly a large part of the debate was about the real ex post cost of 
such a measure, the advocates of the move insisting that due to the substi-
tution between older workers and younger unemployed, the ex post cost 
would be small. The ﬁ  rst costing of this proposal rested on the assumption 
of a substitution rate of 75 percent (i.e., 75 percent of jobs vacated would 
be ﬁ  lled by individuals who would otherwise had been unemployed).8 An 
Institute for Fiscal Studies research paper by Hammond and Morris (1985) 
estimated variants of these costs according to diﬀerent estimations of the 
degree of substitution between older workers and younger ones. They used 
a substitution rate of 50 percent as benchmark but stressed the importance 
of the assumption: “the numbers of people taken from the unemployment 
register or placed on the unemployment register following a change in the 
6. Debates in the House of Commons, 20th November 1984.
7. UK general election manifestos can be found online at http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/
uk/man.htm.
8. Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) evidence to Social Services Commit-
tee (1982).326        James Banks, Richard Blundell, Antoine Bozio, and Carl Emmerson
age at which men and women become eligible for a state pension is a much 
more crucial determinant of the ﬁ  nal cost to government revenues” (34). 
By 1988, the JRS had been phased out for new claimants, and, in the 
1990s, the idea that reducing the labor supply of older workers could help 
mitigate unemployment was dropped altogether from the UK policy debate. 
The Social Security Act of 1986 reduced the generosity of SERPS by com-
puting beneﬁ  ts on the basis of earnings over the entire working life rather 
than across the best twenty years. The reform was phased in between 2000 
and 2008. Figure 11.2 illustrates these reductions in generosity, ﬁ  rst to the 
BSP and then to SERPS.
In recent years, the case against policies that aimed at encouraging earlier 
retirement seemed to generate consensus among UK economists. Layard, 
Nickell, and Jackman (1991) rephrased the “lump-  of-  labor” fallacy as a 
“lump-  of-  output” fallacy (i.e., early retirement can reduce unemployment 
only if one assumes that output is constant) and summarized the view of 
many on early retirement policies. The very recent pension reforms are solely 
concerned with the adequacy of individual retirement saving decisions, 
with recognition that for those with inadequate provision, a combination 
of increased saving and later retirement might be the most appropriate solu-
tion. In April 2002, the State Second Pension (S2P), a scheme more generous 
to low earners, replaced SERPS. With the 2007 Pension Act, requirements to 
qualify for a BSP have been reduced and the level of the BSP increased, while 
state pension age is planned to increase from age sixty- ﬁ  ve to age sixty- eight. 
This dramatic increase did not lead to fears of rising youth unemployment. 
Fig. 11.2    State pension entitlement for male with median (age-  speciﬁ  c) earnings, 
full employment history, 1948–2050
Source: Disney and Emmerson (2005).
Notes: Calculations for individuals with full contribution history with median male age spe-
ciﬁ  c earnings and 2 percent annual economywide real earnings growth. The 2007 Pension Act 
is not included in these computations.Early Retirement and Youth Unemployment in the United Kingdom    3 2 7
Interestingly, a major document from the Labour government, dedicated to 
the elderly and titled Winning the Generation Game (Cabinet Oﬃce 2000), 
contains a speciﬁ  c box denouncing the “lump of labour fallacy”:
The lump of labor fallacy is diﬃcult to dispel because it feels true in 
individual cases and requires a wider understanding of the labor market 
to understand why it is not. It is particularly insidious in relation to older 
people who are detached from the labor market and it should not be 
allowed to inﬂ  uence policies towards this group. (40)
Today’s consensus in the United Kingdom seems to be at the opposite end 
of the spectrum from the early 1980’s consensus.
11.3    Descriptive  Analysis
This section describes trends over time in the economic activity of older 
and younger individuals. Figures 11.3 and 11.4 contrast the evolution of 
labor force participation of the old (deﬁ  ned as those aged ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-
  four to the evolution of the unemployment and employment share of the 
young (deﬁ  ned as those aged twenty to twenty-  four) and of those of the 
prime age (deﬁ  ned as those aged twenty- ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty- four). We use data from 
Fig. 11.3    Labor force participation of older individuals compared to unemploy-
ment of younger individuals
Sources: LFS (1975, 1977, 1979, 1981, and 1983 to 2006) and FES (1968 to 2005).
Notes: Unemployment is expressed as a share the population in the age group (and not as a 
share of the active). The right- hand axis corresponds to the unemployment series, whereas the 
labor force participation series can be read on the left-  hand axis.328        James Banks, Richard Blundell, Antoine Bozio, and Carl Emmerson
the Labour Force Survey (LFS) from 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981, and 1983 
to 2006 (inclusive) and the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) from 1968 
to 2005 (inclusive). Both surveys show very consistent evolution of both 
employment and unemployment rates.
Figure 11.3 illustrates clearly the massive structural shocks of the late 
1970s and early 1980s in the United Kingdom: a massive rise in youth unem-
ployment, a strong rise in unemployment for prime age individuals, and a 
massive drop in labor force participation of older workers (a drop of more 
than 10 percentage points). Unemployment rates of the young and prime 
age were quicker to decline than older workers’ labor force participation, 
which stayed stable until the end of the 1990s. The last period exhibits a 
reversal in these trends, with increased participation of the old and substan-
tial reductions in unemployment of the young and prime aged. Figure 11.4 
provides a similar picture, adding the fact that employment of the prime 
aged have trended upward during the period with the increase in female 
labor force participation, while youth employment has recently been falling 
with increasing participation in higher education.
Figure 11.5 illustrates on one graph the major changes to the various 
public retirement schemes and the labor force participation of older indi-
viduals against the labor participation and unemployment of the young. 
The introduction of SERPS in 1978 increased the generosity of pension 
provisions, while the indexation of state pensions to growth in prices (rather 
Fig. 11.4    Labor force participation of older individuals compared to employment 
of younger individuals
Sources: LFS (1975, 1977, 1979, 1981, and 1983 to 2006) and FES (1968 to 2005).Early Retirement and Youth Unemployment in the United Kingdom    3 2 9
than the greater of growth in prices or earnings) from 1980 onward went in 
the opposite direction. These two reforms predate the large drop in labor 
force participation of the old but hardly explain it. The JRS was introduced 
in 1977 when unemployment of younger individuals had been increasing 
for ﬁ  ve years continuously. The unemployment continued to increase while 
the scheme was extended. Youth unemployment started to decline when the 
scheme was reduced in scope.
From 1984 onward, and up to 1998, the labor force participation of the 
old remained stable in the United Kingdom. Since then, it has been increas-
ing, from 51 percent in 1998 to 59 percent in 2006. It is hard to link directly 
this sizable rise to changes in the pension system. While the generosity of 
SERPS was reduced in 2000, the introduction of S2P from 2002 represented 
an increase in generosity and would be expected to have the opposite impact 
on labor force participation. The planned increase in the state pension age 
is not due to take place before 2010 for women and 2024 for men. Most 
UK commentators have stressed that the increase in elderly employment in 
recent years is largely attributable to the upturn in the economic cycle since 
the mid-  1990s (Disney and Hawkes 2003).
When considering labor force participation in the United Kingdom, one 
Fig. 11.5    Program changes and labor force participation of young and old 
(1968–2006)
Sources: LFS (1975, 1977, 1979, 1981, and 1983 to 2006) and FES (1968 to 2005).
Notes: Unemployment is expressed as a share of the population in the age group (and not as 
a share of the active). The right-  hand axis corresponds to the unemployment series, whereas 
the labor force participation series can be read on the left-  hand axis.330        James Banks, Richard Blundell, Antoine Bozio, and Carl Emmerson
has also to acknowledge the rise in the numbers claiming incapacity beneﬁ  ts. 
After the end of the JRS, the Invalidity Beneﬁ  t scheme (later reformed into 
the Incapacity Beneﬁ  t) has seen the number of its recipients increase dramat-
ically. Figure 11.6 shows the number of recipients of the Invalidity/Incapac-
ity Beneﬁ  t for the ﬁ  fty to sixty- four age group (both male and female). These 
schemes became, over the decade from the mid- 1980s onward, a major path 
of early exit from the labor force. From April 1995, the Invalidity Beneﬁ  t was 
replaced by the Incapacity Beneﬁ  t for new recipients, with the latter having 
a more stringent health test. The reform stopped the growth in recipients 
but did not reverse the trend. The replacement of Incapacity Beneﬁ  t with 
the Employment Support Allowance from October 2008, which again is 
intended to have a more stringent health test, is expected by the Government 
to reduce the number of beneﬁ  ciaries.
Figure 11.7 illustrates the various paths toward retirement in the United 
Kingdom and the importance of the “sick or disabled” route. The massive 
drop in employment rates in the late 1970s is again very clear. First unem-
ployment increases, then the share of older individuals reporting that they 
are retired or that they are “sick or disabled” increases considerably. The 
number reporting that they are “sick or disabled” only starts falling in the 
period from 1995 onwards, during which an increase in employment and a 
fall in unemployment are also observed. The proportion reporting that they 
are retired is little changed over the period from the late 1980s onward.
So far the descriptive evidence hardly supports the claim that older work-
Fig. 11.6    Number of invalidity beneﬁ  t and incapacity beneﬁ  t recipients aged 50 to 
the state pension age, 1971–2006
Source: Computations from the authors using the EIRNI database (Anyadike-  Danes and 
McVicar 2008).Early Retirement and Youth Unemployment in the United Kingdom    3 3 1
ers crowd out younger ones. The UK case seems to highlight that both old 
and young workers react to the general economic conditions. In times of 
relative economic hardship, youth unemployment rises while older labor 
force participation is reduced; in times of economic expansion, the employ-
ment level of both groups increases. To understand better the possible rela-
tionship between retirement incentives and youth unemployment, one can 
advantageously undertake a cross-  country comparison—which is, ﬁ  nally, 
the raison d’être of this volume.
We thus present in ﬁ  gure 11.8 a France-  United Kingdom comparison 
of employment rates of older workers over the 1968 to 2005 period. This 
comparison is very interesting because both countries are of similar size 
and have relatively similar economies. Both have had signiﬁ  cant and aging 
primary and secondary industries that were hit by the 1970s oil shocks and 
restructured in the 1980s in part with the help of early retirement schemes. 
Both countries have experienced large drop in employment rates of those 
ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve years old and above until the mid-  1980s. Even though France had 
lower employment rates among both sixty to sixty-  four-  year-  olds and ﬁ  fty-
 ﬁ  v e -    t o   ﬁ  f t y -  n i n e -  y e a r -  o l d s   b e f o r e   t h e s e   m a c r o e c o n o m i c   s h o c k s ,   t h e   U K -  
France diﬀerence is no diﬀerent in 1983 to that seen in the late 1960s. Both 
countries have used early retirement schemes even if public subsidies for 
these schemes were far more developed in France than the United Kingdom, 
where only the JRS can be seen as a public early retirement scheme. Early 
retirement schemes in France also started as private schemes but have been 
progressively extended to become public policies.
Fig. 11.7    Employment status of older men (55–69 years old)
Source: FES (1968 to 2004)332        James Banks, Richard Blundell, Antoine Bozio, and Carl Emmerson
While the JRS was designed to be—and turned out to be—temporary, 
the French government decided to stabilize the trend toward the use of 
early retirement vehicles by introducing permanent changes to the pension 
system, that is, by lowering the retirement age from sixty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty. The 
idea was that the need for early retirement schemes (i.e., schemes that were 
not part of the formal pension system) would thus disappear and that by 
providing pensions earlier to every retiree, it would be more fair. From 1983 
onward, trends in employment rates of the French and UK elderly began 
to diverge markedly. While the UK employment rate of those sixty to sixty-
  four years old remained stable at 50 percent, the French one went on fall-
ing, down to 14 percent in 2000. While the diﬀerence for this age group was 
only 15 percentage points in 1968, it is now more than 35 percentage points 
apart. The 1983 French pension reform also reduced the incentives to work 
for those sixty-  ﬁ  ve and above. The employment rate of those sixty-  ﬁ  ve to 
sixty- nine years old, at roughly the same level up the mid- 1980s, started also 
to diverge. French employment males past age sixty- ﬁ  ve is now almost non-
existent, while close to 20 percent of UK males aged sixty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  nine 
were still working in 2006, with a clear trend over the last ten years toward 
increased employment among this group.
A comparison between youth unemployment in France and in the United 
Kingdom is shown in ﬁ  gure 11.9. The share of the twenty to twenty- four age 
group unemployed according to International Labour Organization (ILO) 
deﬁ  nition is compared across both countries over the same period as in ﬁ  gure 
11.8. First, it should be noted that this is not the unemployment rate usually 
Fig. 11.8    Employment rates of the older men (France-  United Kingdom)
Sources: FES (1968 to 1982) and LFS (1983 to 2005) for the United Kingdom, Enquête Em-
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presented (i.e., the unemployed as a share of the active). Given the marked 
diﬀerences between the two countries in terms of the share of the twenty 
to twenty-  four age group in education, unemployment rates might not be 
considered as directly comparable. The striking fact emerging from ﬁ  gure 
11.9 is that youth unemployment shares are very similar in both countries 
and do react strongly to changes in general economic conditions. When LFP 
of the old was declining similarly in both countries (up to the early 1980s as 
shown in ﬁ  gure 11.8), youth unemployment was rising almost identically. 
The higher intensity of early retirement policies in France and the divergence 
in LFP of the old described in ﬁ  gure 11.8 did not seem to have led to any 
signiﬁ  cant decrease of youth unemployment in France relative to that seen 
in the United Kingdom. If anything, youth unemployment has been higher 
in France than in the United Kingdom in recent years.
All these descriptive analyses do not provide causal evidence in any sense, 
but they suggest convincingly that over the long term, higher (lower) labor 
force participation of the old is not related to higher (lower) unemployment 
of the young.
11.4      An Evaluation of the Job Release Scheme
The only public policy in the United Kingdom with the aim to reduce 
unemployment by enticing older workers to retire is the JRS. This section 
describes its implementation in detail and presents estimates of its pos-
Fig. 11.9    Share of the 20–24 age group unemployed (France-  United Kingdom)
Sources: FES (1968 to 1982) and LFS (1983 to 2005) for the United Kingdom. Enquête 
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sible eﬀect using a diﬀerence- in- diﬀerences methodology. The goal is to 
assess whether this speciﬁ  c policy has had a measured positive impact on 
youth employment in the short term, irrespective of its long term and wider 
impact.
The JRS was introduced in the United Kingdom in 1977 by a Labour 
government and was expanded in the early 1980s under the Conservative 
government of Margaret (now Lady) Thatcher. It was supposed to be tem-
porary and very selective (contrary to examples in continental Europe of 
general early retirement schemes). It was ﬁ  rst limited to employees within 
one year of the state pension age (ﬁ  fty-  nine for women and sixty-  four for 
men) in some speciﬁ  c areas of the country (Assisted Areas) where unemploy-
ment was more prevalent. The scheme required the employer to provide a 
job to an individual from the unemployment register. A JRS claimant must 
agree not to take another job, nor set up a self-  employed business.
The scheme was changed at multiple times as ﬁ  gure 11.10 exempliﬁ  es. 
Very soon after its introduction, it was limited to full-  time employees. 
In April 1977, it was extended nationwide, then extended temporarily to 
younger men (aged sixty-  two and sixty-  three) in 1979 to 1980 (but not 
younger women), then restricted for new claimants to sixty-  four-  year-  old 
men (with ﬁ  fty-  nine-  year-  old women still eligible), then again extended in 
1982 to 1984 to men and women within three years of the state pension age 
before being restricted for new claimants once more to just those within one 
Fig. 11.10    Numbers supported by the JRS allowance (yearly average)
Sources: House of Commons Session 1988–1989; Employment Committee 2nd report “The 
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year of the state pension age. It was closed in early 1988. A similar scheme 
applied to part-  time jobs (the Part-  Time JRS). Its take-  up rate was much 
lower than the full-  time scheme, with only a few thousand recipients.
The JRS oﬀered a ﬂ  at rate allowance (described in detail in appendix A) 
and, therefore, was more attractive to low earners or individuals that could 
claim a private occupational pension alongside a JRS award. If the allow-
ance was low relative to average earnings, it was 40 percent higher than the 
ﬂ  at rate BSP (available at age sixty-  ﬁ  ve for men) and 70 percent higher than 
the unemployment beneﬁ  t. Surveys of recipients of JRS show that, indeed, 
many individuals received an occupational pension alongside the scheme 
allowance (Makeham and Morgan 1980).
The JRS was put in place in times of rising youth unemployment. Fig-
ure 11.11 shows the rise in the share of youth unemployed compared to 
the numbers supported by the JRS. The scheme was (generally) expanded 
until 1984 and was reduced in scale in 1985, just when youth unemployment 
stopped rising. The high correlation between the expansion of the JRS and 
unemployment highlights the estimation diﬃculties encountered in this vol-
ume. It is impossible to attribute any success to the JRS in reducing youth 
unemployment, and, in addition, it appears clear that the introduction of 
this scheme was prompted by rising youth unemployment.
The fact that the conditions to qualify for this scheme changed so many 
times is a dream scenario for economists willing to evaluate a policy. It 
Fig. 11.11    Youth unemployment and numbers supported by the JRS (1973–1990)
Sources: See ﬁ  gure 11.3 for youth unemployment and ﬁ  gure 11.10 for numbers on JRS.
Notes: Youth unemployment as a share of population is shown in the right-  hand axis, while 
numbers supported by the JRS are to be read in the left-  hand axis (in thousands).336        James Banks, Richard Blundell, Antoine Bozio, and Carl Emmerson
generates many treated and control groups. Unfortunately, no speciﬁ  c data 
are available to study the individuals possibly aﬀected—the scheme took 
place a long time ago, at a time policy evaluations were far from being as 
developed as today. Nevertheless, we can use the LFS for the years 1975, 
1977, 1979, 1981, and 1983 to 1989 (inclusive) to study the impact of the 
JRS on the employment of the old. Our methodology will rely on estimating 
diﬀerence- in- diﬀerences impact on the employment of the old using changes 
in the age threshold.
We use each change in the rules determining eligibility to JRS as pseudo 
natural experiment. We estimate the eﬀect of being eligible to the JRS on 
employment rates of males controlling for age dummies and year dummies. 
Results are presented in table 11.1. The expansion of the scheme seemed 
to lead to a reduction in the employment rates of the age group concerned 
(speciﬁ  cations [1] and [3]), but neither of the two periods of restriction of the 
scheme lead to a statistically signiﬁ  cant increase in employment (speciﬁ  ca-
tions [2] and [5]). The estimation using all the changes in scheme eligibility 
(speciﬁ  cation [4]) leads to a 3.6 percentage point decline in the employment 
rate of sixty-  two-   to sixty-  four-  year-  old men as a result of the JRS (from 
a base of 44 percent). A causal interpretation is possible only under the 
common trend assumption, that is, that 61- year- olds have had no change in 
employment prospects from sixty-  two-  year-  olds during this period, except 
through the impact of the JRS. This might be a strong assumption. Older 
Table 11.1  Estimated impact of the Job Release Scheme on employment of the old 
and the young
Old Young
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)
Coeﬃcient
 
 –0.035∗ –0.014 –0.056∗∗∗ –0.036∗∗∗ 0.007 0.038∗∗∗
(0.021)   (0.028)   (0.017)   (0.007)   (0.021)   (0.003)
Notes: Speciﬁ  cation (1) corresponds to the introduction of the Job Release Scheme (JRS) to 
62, 63, and 64 years old in 1979 as compared to 61 years old in 1977 (unaﬀected in both years). 
Speciﬁ  cation (2) corresponds to the restriction of the JRS to 63 years and above in 1981. We 
compare 63 years old to 62 years old in both years. The coeﬃcient presented is the interaction 
between being 62 years old in 1981. If the removal of the JRS led to increase in employment 
rate of 62 years old, we would expect a positive and signiﬁ  cant sign. Speciﬁ  cation (3) corre-
sponds to the expansion of the JRS to 62 and 63 years old in 1983 and 1984; 61 and 64 years 
old are used as controls. Speciﬁ  cation (4) corresponds to a general analysis of the eﬀect of JRS 
over the entire period, controlling for age and period dummies. Speciﬁ  cation (5) corresponds 
to the restriction of the scheme after 1984 to the 64 years old, using 63 years old as controls. 
If the removal of the JRS had had a positive impact on employment of the 63 years, we would 
have expected a negative sign. Speciﬁ  cation (6) corresponds to the coeﬃcient on JRS variable 
in a regression of youth unemployment status with sex and age dummies as controls (period 
1975–1989). Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
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workers might be more likely to reduce their labor force participation in 
times of rising unemployment, even without early retirement schemes. The 
fact that we do not ﬁ  nd statistically signiﬁ  cant reversal of the trend when 
eligibility to the scheme is restricted adds to this possible weakness.
Even if we accept the result that the JRS had a negative impact on employ-
ment of the old, we cannot directly apply this methodology to assess its 
impact on youth labor status. The diﬀerence- in- diﬀerences methodology 
rests on comparing alike older individuals, but no young can be deemed 
unaﬀected as “jobs released” by sixty-  three or sixty-  two-  year-  olds can be 
ﬁ  lled by any young unemployed. The only strategy left for us is to use the 
variation in eligibility to the scheme over time and compare the periods 
of increased eligibility to periods of restrictions. We run a regression on 
unemployment probability of those aged twenty to twenty- four, controlling 
for age and sex dummies adding the number of jobs presumably released as 
a share of youth population (speciﬁ  cation [6]).9 The results lead to signiﬁ  -
cantly positive coeﬃcients of the JRS eligibility variable, that is, an increase 
in the numbers supported by the JRS is associated with a 2 percentage points 
increase in the unemployment probability of the young, controlling for year, 
age, and sex. We do not interpret this result as causal—we have shown that 
the JRS eligibility was linked to expansion of youth unemployment and to 
the political need to expand this policy.
Even when looking at one speciﬁ  c early retirement scheme, which was 
conditioned on hiring unemployed, we do not ﬁ  nd conclusive evidence of 
at least some substitution between young and older workers. This does not, 
again, prove that these schemes have had no eﬀect on the youth unemploy-
ment, but despite our best eﬀort, we have not been able to identify, even in 
the short run, their presumed positive (negative) impact on youth employ-
ment (unemployment).
11.5    Regression  Analysis
In this section, we present regression analyses based on data from the 
United Kingdom covering the entire period, that is, from 1968 to 2005. Table 
11.2 presents the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that 
exhibit simple correlations between employment of the old and labor status 
of the young. These estimations have been done following similar speciﬁ  ca-
tions in every country of this volume to facilitate comparisons. The table 
reproduces the coeﬃcients on the employment rate of those aged ﬁ  fty- ﬁ  ve to 
sixty-  four. The top part of the table shows pure correlations between labor 
market status of the young and employment rate of the old. Four speciﬁ  ca-
tions are presented, in “levels,” that is, rates of population regressed on rates, 
9. We use the number of claimants of the JRS as a proxy for the number of “jobs 
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“three years lag,” “ﬁ  ve years diﬀerences,” and “ﬁ  ve years log diﬀerences.” 
The bottom part of the table presents the same regressions including a set 
of controls, that is, a constant, GDP per head, growth of GDP per head, 
and the share of manufacturing within GDP.
Results of correlations without any controls show strong positive asso-
ciation between employment of the young and employment of the old and 
strong negative association between employment of the old and youth 
unemployment. In other words, when labor market conditions are good for 
the old, they are typically also good for the young.
Once controls are included, the magnitude of this strong association is 
reduced but remains largely statistically signiﬁ  cant. Even controlling for 
GDP and its variations, there remains a positive association between employ-
ment rates of the old and employment rates of the young. These correlations 
Table 11.2  Direct relationship between the elderly labor force participation and the 
unemployment or employment of younger individuals
Youth 20–24 Prime age 25–54
    UE   EMP   SCH   UE   EMP
No controls
Levels –0.53∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ –0.84∗∗∗ –0.27∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.15) (0.25) (0.03) (0.05)
3- year  lag –0.21∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ –1.10∗∗∗ –0.15∗∗∗ 0.06
(0.10) (0.14) (0.20) (0.04) (0.05)
5- year  diﬀerences –0.68∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.22 –0.32∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.18) (0.15) (0.05) (0.08)
5-  year log diﬀerences –2.85∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.13 –2.91∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(90.60) (0.12) (0.24) (0.51) (0.04)
With controls
Levels –0.18∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ –0.24∗∗ –0.20∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.13) (0.13) (0.04) (0.07)
3- year  lag –0.06 0.09 –0.08 –0.11∗∗∗ 0.07
(0.06) (0.13) (0.12) (0.04) (0.07)
5- year  diﬀerences –0.28∗∗ 0.56∗∗ –0.09 –0.21∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.25) (0.22) (0.07) (0.11)
5-  year log diﬀerences
 
–1.00∗ 0.34∗ –0.22 –1.75∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
  (0.53)   (0.19)   (0.38)   (0.56)   (0.06)
Notes: Reported is the coeﬃcient on elderly employment (55–64 years old), with its standard 
error in parentheses. The dependent variable is mentioned at the top of each column, that is, 
for the ﬁ  rst columns, it is the share of unemployment of youth aged 20–24 regressed on the 
employment rate of those aged 55–64. UE   the share of the population unemployed; EMP 
  the share of the population in work; SCH   the share of the population in school and not 
in work.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
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are not necessarily causal eﬀects. They suggest simply that in the long term 
in the United Kingdom, one does not ﬁ  nd changes in employment rates of 
one age group at the expense of the other.
Even after adding the controls for the aggregate eﬀects of GDP growth 
and so on in table 11.2, it may well be that the elderly labor force is endoge-
nous. One option is to exploit the incentive measures to retire as computed in 
previous volumes of the International Social Security (ISS)-  NBER project 
(see Gruber and Wise 1999). We have established in section 11.2 of this 
chapter that pension reforms in the United Kingdom were not inﬂ  uenced 
by concerns relative to youth unemployment (early retirement scheme like 
the JRS were cautiously kept out of social security elements). In that case, 
incentives measures that are good predictors of the probability to retire seem 
like reliable instruments to assess the impact of labor force participation on 
youth unemployment. The diﬃculty is that the macroeconomic nature of 
the estimation problem makes it impossible to remain at the microeconomic 
level. Eﬀects on youth unemployment can only be assessed at the times series 
level (because it is not possible to apply the ﬁ  nancial incentives to work faced 
by older individuals to the employment prospects of younger individuals at 
any more disaggregated level). It is, therefore, necessary to build incentives 
measures that do conﬁ  dently explain labor force participation of older indi-
viduals in the times series dimension.
Table 11.3 contrasts the impact of our incentives measures at the micro 
level and at the aggregated level (times series) on the probability to retire. 
Speciﬁ  cations (1) and (2) are based on estimation on micro data at the year, 
age, and sex level. The standard model of Social Security Wealth (SSW) and 
Peak value (PV) is estimated with a variant in the deﬁ  nition of the peak value 
(PV∗). Detailed information on these incentives measures can be found in 
Table 11.3  Incentives measures and the probability to retire
Micro- level  estimation Times series estimation
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  
SSW 0.0030∗∗ 0.0054∗∗ –0.0005 –0.0007




          (0.0011)       (0.0018) 
Notes: Controls are constant, gross domestic product (GDP) per head, growth in GDP per 
head, and share of manufacturing in the economy. SSW   social security wealth; PV   peak 
value; PV∗   a variant in the deﬁ  nition of the peak value. Standard errors are in paren-
theses.
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appendix B. Controls include age, year, and sex dummies as well as inter-
actions between sex, age, and year. At the micro level, both incentives are 
statistically signiﬁ  cant with the expected sign. Higher SSW leads to higher 
probability to retire, while higher peak value, that is, how much it is worth 
to delay retirement, leads to lower retirement probability.
The results in times series are presented in speciﬁ  cations (3) and (4). Incen-
tives and the dependent variable are aggregated at the year level. Controls 
include the same set of variables than in table 11.2, that is, constant, GDP, 
growth of GDP, and share of manufacturing within GDP. All the eﬀect of 
the incentives vanishes completely at the times series level. There are impor-
tant reasons that can account for this. First, both retirement incentives and 
employment rates vary greatly by sex and age within the same year. Estimat-
ing the impact of precise incentives on micro data makes use of these impor-
tant variations. Changes in times series are per se much smoother. Second, 
the time variations that may account for changes in economic environment 
are fully taken into account at the micro level (through the inclusion of year 
dummies) without concern but need to be carefully controlled for in the time 
series regressions with all the caveats that entails.
The incentive variables, therefore, do not provide powerful instruments for 
the older labor force variable in the regressions of table 11.2. Consequently, 
our results have to rest on the discussion of policy experiments in section 
11.4 and the regressions in table 11.2. We ﬁ  nd no evidence that changes in 
employment rates of older workers adversely aﬀect the employment rate of 
the young.
11.6    Conclusion
Policies to foster early retirement to release jobs for the young have been 
limited in the United Kingdom. Pension provisions have been more inﬂ  u-
enced by constraints on the public ﬁ  nances, a desire to “privatize” the sys-
tem, and, more recently, with concerns with the adequacy of retirement 
saving than by youth unemployment. However the example of the JRS (1977 
to 1988) shows that a desire to increase youth employment opportunities was 
also present in the United Kingdom at some stage. Looking precisely at the 
impact of this scheme, we ﬁ  nd some evidence that it reduced employment 
of the old but no positive eﬀect can be found on youth employment. When 
looking at the entire 1968 to 2005 period, labor force participation of the old 
is positively associated with employment of the young. Controlling for the 
business cycle reduces the magnitude of the correlation but does not alter 
this positive association.
Overall, we ﬁ  nd no evidence of long-  term crowding out of younger indi-
viduals from the labor market by older workers. The evidence, according to 
a variety of methods, points always in the direction of an absence of such 
a relationship.Early Retirement and Youth Unemployment in the United Kingdom    3 4 1
Appendix A
Job Release Scheme Allowance
Table 11A.1  Weekly allowance of the full-  time Job Release Scheme (in pounds sterling)
Tax-  free (men aged 64, women aged 59)
Taxable allowance (disabled men 60–63, 
able men aged 62 or 63)

















01/01/1977 23.00 — — — — —
01/11/1977 26.50 — — — — —
01/07/1978 26.50 35.00  8.50 — — —
01/04/1979 31.50 40.00  8.50 — — —
06/04/1980 36.00 45.50 10.00 43.00 53.00 10.00
01/04/1981 40.00 50.50 11.00 47.50 59.00 11.00
01/04/1982 43.50 55.00 12.00 52.00 64.00 12.00
11/04/1983 45.70 57.75 13.00 54.60 67.20 13.00
01/04/1984 48.00 60.75 13.00 57.35 70.55 13.00
01/04/1985 49.95 63.00 13.00 58.35 71.15 13.00
01/04/1986 51.95 65.50 13.00 60.65 74.00 13.00
01/04/1987 53.90 67.55 13.00 61.15 74.50 13.00
01/04/1988  56.05   70.25   13.00   62.15   75.50   13.00
Sources: Makeham and Morgan (1980); Tolley’s Social Security and State beneﬁ  ts, 1981, 1982, 1983–
1984, 1985, 1986, 1987–1988; Written answers March 1979, House of Commons; Special employment 
measures 1980–1981, 14 February 1980, House of Commons; Speech 12 June 1985, House of Commons; 
Written answers 10 July 1985, House of Commons; Written answers 19 March 1986, House of Com-
mons; Written answers 1 April 1987, House of Commons; Written answers 30 March 1988, House of 
Commons. Dashes indicate no speciﬁ  c allowance.
Table 11A.2  Weekly allowance of the part-  time Job Release Scheme (in pounds sterling)
Tax-  free (men 64, women 59)
Taxable allowance (disabled men 60–63, 
able men aged 62 or 63)

















03/10/1983 22.85 28.90 13.00 27.30 33.60 13.00
01/04/1984 24.00 30.35 13.00 28.65 35.30 13.00
01/04/1985 28.95 35.55 13.00 33.80 10.70 13.00
01/04/1986 30.10 37.00 13.00 35.15 42.35 13.00
01/04/1987 31.15 38.05 13.00 35.80 43.00 13.00
01/04/1988     —   —    —    37.25   44.70   13.00
Sources: Tolley’s Social Security and State beneﬁ  ts, 1983–1984, 1985, 1986; Written answers 19 March 
1986, House of Commons; Written answers 1 April 1987, House of Commons; Written answers 30 
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Appendix B
Incentives Measures
The incentives we have computed for this volume follow the ones described 
in Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004). As each exercise leads to variants of these 
incentives measures, we detail in this appendix the exact computations done 
in this chapter.
For an individual aged t, we ﬁ  rst compute Social Security Wealth at age t 
(SSWt). The value of the Social Security Wealth depends on the age, t    t, 
at which the individual decide to retire and is given by:











with Bs(t ) the expected level of pension at age s for an individual who retired 
at age t ,   (s/t) the probability of surviving up to age s for an individual 
aged t, and T the maximal age at death. The SSW incentive in this volume 
includes beneﬁ  ts paid to the survival spouse, but no other schemes than the 
state pensions (BSP, SERPS, and S2P). In particular, it does not include the 
Invalidity Beneﬁ  t or Incapacity Beneﬁ  t, beneﬁ  ts from the JRS, or beneﬁ  ts 
targeted at those on low incomes. Social Security Wealth does not include 
social security contributions (or other taxes) either.
The second incentive, the Peak Value (PV), is the absolute value of the 
diﬀerence between the maximum of the Social Security Wealth associated 
to all possible ages at retirement and Social Security Wealth in case of an 
immediate retirement:
PVt    Max
s
(SSWt,s)−SSWt,t
A variant of the Peak Value (PV∗) is the maximum present value of the 
Social Security Wealth associated to all possible ages at retirement beyond 
the current year:
PVt∗   Max
s≥t+1
(SSWt,s)
To compute these incentives, we simulate pensions at each age and in each 
year for three diﬀerent types (men with full working life, women with full 
working life, and women with reduced working life) and for each decile of 
the earnings distribution. Earnings proﬁ  les are estimated on the 1923 cohort 
and then earnings growth is applied to all other cohorts. Going forward, we 
assume 2.5 percent inﬂ  ation and 2 percent real growth in earnings.
Average incentives by year, sex, and age, as well as at the year level, are 
computed using weights computed from the FES.Early Retirement and Youth Unemployment in the United Kingdom    3 4 3
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